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The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene 
Stephen I. Vladeck∗ 
I doubt any of my colleagues will vote to grant a [habeas] petition 
if he or she believes that it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is 
an al Qaeda adherent or an active supporter.
1
 
 
These cases present hard questions and hard choices, ones best 
faced directly. Judicial review, however, is just that: re-view, an in-
direct and necessarily backward looking process.  And looking 
backward may not be enough in this new war.
2
 
 
“They were careless people,” he read.  “They smashed things 
up . . . and let other people clean up the mess they had made.”
3
 
 
 In retrospect, one of the most important decisions by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in the terrorism detention litigation of the 
past decade may well have been an all-but unnoticed “GVR” order 
(granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding) issued by the Justices 
two days after they decided Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
4
 Rasul v. Bush,
5
 and 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.  Thanks to 
Bobby Chesney, Amanda Frost, Jon Hafetz, Marty Lederman, and Ben Wittes for in-
credibly useful discussions and comments; to Kristin Makar and the editors of the 
Seton Hall Law Review for the invitation to participate in this Symposium and for their 
patience; and to Jason Thelen for research assistance.  For full disclosure, I note that 
I served at some point as co-counsel to either the detainee or to amici curiae in sup-
port of the detainee in a number of the cases discussed herein, including Al-Bihani, 
Boumediene, Hamdan, Kiyemba II, and (Farhi) Mohammed. 
 1 Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concur-
ring). 
 2 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
 3 Editorial, A Right Without a Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A26 (quoting 
Hon. A. Raymond Randolph, Joseph Story Distinguished Lecture: The Guantanamo Mess, 
Address Delivered to the Heritage Found. (Oct. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Events/2010/10/Guantanamo-Mess (comparing the Jus-
tices in the Boumediene majority to characters in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby).  
 4 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 5 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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Rumsfeld v. Padilla
6
 in June 2004.  In Bush v. Gherebi,
7
 the Court va-
cated a 2003 Ninth Circuit decision that had concluded, contrary to 
the D.C. Circuit,
8
 that the federal courts did have statutory jurisdiction 
over habeas petitions brought by non-citizens detained at Guantána-
mo.
9
  Indeed, Judge Reinhardt’s opinion in Gherebi had anticipated 
many of the arguments adopted by the Court in Rasul.
10
  Neverthe-
less, the Justices sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit, with instruc-
tions to reconsider its decision—not in light of Rasul,
11
 but in light of 
Padilla, in which the Justices had held that the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York was not the appropriate forum to 
consider a habeas petition brought by a U.S. citizen detained at a 
South Carolina navy brig.
12
 
By remanding for reconsideration in light of Padilla rather than 
Rasul, the Gherebi GVR order implicitly hinted that, even though the 
federal courts in general had jurisdiction over the Guantánamo ha-
beas cases, the Supreme Court believed that there was only one ap-
propriate venue for such suits—the federal courts in and for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.  The Ninth Circuit got the hint, transferring Gherebi 
to the D.C. District Court.
13
  As a result, and ever since the summer of 
2004, the D.C. District Court and D.C. Circuit have exercised a de fac-
to form of exclusive jurisdiction over any and all claims arising out of 
Guantánamo.
14
 
 
 6 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 7 542 U.S. 952 (2004) (mem.).  
 8 See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the habeas statute did not confer jurisdiction over the Guantánamo detainees 
and relying heavily on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).   
 9 Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004). 
 10 Compare, e.g., id. at 1284–99, with Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475–80, and Rasul, 542 U.S. 
at 485–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 11 Gherebi, 542 U.S. at 952. 
 12 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442–47. 
 13 Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004).  Based on Gherebi, the federal 
district court in Seattle also transferred the initial petition for habeas or mandamus 
relief filed by Salim Hamdan in which he sought to challenge his trial by military 
commission.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Mili-
tary Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 295, 322 n.155 (2010). 
 14 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795–96 (2008) (suggesting that ve-
nue is only appropriate in the D.C. courts).  Of course, it does not follow from Padilla 
that all Guantánamo cases must be brought in the District of Columbia, since, unlike 
in Padilla, the detainees are not held within the territorial jurisdiction of any particu-
lar court.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 453 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(distinguishing Rasul).  Instead, the Gherebi GVR order simply reflects the longstand-
ing—but never analytically explained—norm that the District of Columbia is the 
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There things stood in June 2008, when the Supreme Court in 
Boumediene v. Bush held that the Guantánamo detainees are constitu-
tionally entitled to pursue habeas relief in the federal courts.
15
  In the 
ensuing three years, the focus has been on how the D.C. courts would 
implement Boumediene’s mandate that these cases go forward in the 
absence of any statutory authority, especially given the Supreme 
Court’s express delegation to the lower courts of the power to fashion 
procedural, evidentiary, and even substantive rules to govern the de-
tainees’ claims.
16
  The result has been, by any account, a remarkably 
interesting and complex body of case law.
17
 Increasingly in recent 
months, these cases have also come to inform a heated debate over 
the relationship between the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Boumediene. 
In particular, a number of scholars, civil liberties groups, and de-
tainee lawyers (not to mention the editorial pages of various major 
newspapers) have accused the D.C. Circuit in general—and some of 
its judges in particular—of actively subverting Boumediene by adopting 
holdings and reaching results that have both the intent and the effect 
of vitiating the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision.
18
  These critiques 
usually play up both the deep-seated disagreements between the D.C. 
Circuit and the D.C. District Court in some of these cases (as mani-
fested, for example, by the D.C. Circuit’s refusal thus far to affirm a 
single district court holding that granted habeas relief on the me-
rits—reversing or vacating six such decisions),
19
 and the fact that pro-
government rulings by the court of appeals have been reversed by the 
Supreme Court in each of the Guantánamo cases that the Court has 
 
proper venue for any individual held in U.S. custody outside the territorial United 
States.  See, e.g., Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1328–29 (1973) (Douglas, J.); see also 
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 359 n.52 (2d ed. 1973). 
 15 553 U.S. at 798. 
 16 See, e.g., id. (“[O]ur opinion does not address the content of the law that go-
verns petitioners’ detention.  That is a matter yet to be determined.”). 
 17 See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF 
DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2d ed. 2011); Baher 
Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 445 (2010).  
 18 See, e.g., A Right Without a Remedy, supra note 3; see also David G. Savage, Little 
Headway Made at Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at A14.  
 19 See Latif v. Obama, No. 10-5319 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2011) (mem.); Almerfedi v. 
Obama, No. 10-5291, 2011 WL 2277607 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2011); Uthman v. Ob-
ama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 700 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam); Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 
613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
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taken—decisions that, in turn, have been criticized publicly by at least 
some of the D.C. Circuit’s judges.
20
 
As such, these critics have all but suggested that the D.C. Circuit 
has an inappropriate agenda, one in which the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in these cases should be given as narrow a compass as is re-
motely defensible.
21
  In contrast, defenders of the work of the court of 
appeals have stressed both the extent to which Boumediene necessarily 
left these issues open to judicial resolution and the near-unanimity of 
the D.C. Circuit in virtually all of the post-Boumediene cases—
especially in its decisions on the “merits.”
22
  Indeed, even if some of 
the D.C. Circuit’s judges have been outspoken in their criticisms of 
the Supreme Court, the fact remains that very few of the court’s post-
Boumediene opinions have elicited published dissents,
23
 and none have 
successfully been taken en banc.  And with one equivocal exception, 
the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in every post-Boumediene 
Guantánamo case it has thus far been asked to hear.
24
 
In the following Symposium Essay, I aim to look more carefully 
at the parameters of this debate, and the charge that the D.C. Circuit 
has spent the better part of the past three years subverting Boume-
diene.  In particular, I contrast the analyses and holdings of the court 
of appeals in some of its key decisions with the Supreme Court’s in-
structions—such as they were—in Boumediene v. Bush, Hamdi, and, to 
a lesser degree, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
25
  As I hope to show (and as may 
 
 20 For a more comprehensive summary of the Supreme Court’s post-9/11 efforts, 
see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122 
(2011). 
 21 See, e.g., A Right Without a Remedy, supra note 3. 
 22 See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, We Have Seen the Enemy, LAWFARE (Mar. 2, 2011, 5:17 
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/we-have-seen-the-enemy.  
 23 Even disagreements among panel members have usually provoked only con-
currences—disputes over the rationale or the scope of the holding but not the un-
derlying judgment.  See, e.g., Almerfedi, 2011 WL 2277607, at *6–8 (Rogers, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 883–86 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(Williams, J., concurring in the judgment).  Judge Tatel has apparently authored a 
forty-five-page dissent in the Latif case, but the opinion has not yet been declassified. 
See Latif v. Obama, No. 10-5319 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2011) (mem.). Such an opinion 
would be the first such dissent authored in a post-Boumediene “merits” case, as op-
posed to cases raising other questions. 
 24 The exception is Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), 
in which the Court granted certiorari and issued a short per curiam opinion remand-
ing the case to the D.C. Circuit for consideration of changed factual circumstances. 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam). 
 25 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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seem unsurprising), the answer to this charge lies somewhere in the 
middle. 
Although there are no holdings in Guantánamo cases to which 
one can point as “proof” that the D.C. Circuit has refused to take the 
Supreme Court seriously, the court’s analysis as to evidentiary issues 
and the burden of proof, in particular, reveals some judges who read 
the Supreme Court’s work in this field for as little as it is worth—if 
not less.  So too, Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s assessment of whether a 
provision of the REAL ID Act of 2005
26
 might violate the Suspension 
Clause by depriving individuals facing transfer to another country of 
a chance to contest the legality of that transfer.
27
  Although Omar did 
not arise out of Guantánamo, it may represent the most frontal as-
sault on the logic of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion for the Bou-
mediene Court.  And in public speeches and concurrences, senior D.C. 
Circuit Judges A. Raymond Randolph and Laurence Silberman have 
gone even further, belittling the Supreme Court for what Judge Ran-
dolph referred to as the “mess” they made and what Judge Silberman 
described as a “charade,” prompted by the Court’s “defiant—if only 
theoretical—assertion of judicial supremacy” in Boumediene.
28
 
At the same time, some of the court’s holdings in its more out-
wardly controversial decisions, especially those involving the transfer 
or release of the Uighurs, can be criticized, if at all, as failures of im-
agination or misreadings of Supreme Court precedent (for example, 
as controlling the resolution of issues that may still be open).  So too, 
one could quibble with the D.C. Circuit’s refusal in Al Maqaleh v. 
Gates to extend the protections of the Suspension Clause to non-
citizens detained in Afghanistan.
29
  But whatever one’s view of the 
merits of these outcomes, it seems unfair to claim that, in these con-
texts, the D.C. Circuit is subverting Supreme Court rules that simply 
do not exist. 
Ultimately, my thesis is that, while it smacks of hyperbole to refer 
to the D.C. Circuit as being engaged in a collective effort to subvert 
Boumediene, it is equally unconvincing to assert that the entire court of 
appeals has faithfully administered the Supreme Court’s commands 
 
 26 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2006). 
 27 Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 19–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   
 28 Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concur-
ring). 
 29 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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in these cases.
30
  Instead, as I hope to show in the pages that follow, 
the most troubling aspects of the court’s post-Boumediene jurispru-
dence can all be traced to some combination of four jurists, in par-
ticular: the aforementioned Judges Kavanaugh, Randolph and Sil-
berman, along with Judge Janice Rogers Brown.  Whether the rest of 
the D.C. Circuit is reaching the correct results in other cases is beyond 
the ambit of this Essay; for present purposes, my central conclusion is 
that, in their opinions and their rhetoric, these four jurists are effec-
tively fighting a rear-guard action while their colleagues coalesce 
around substantive and procedural rules that are materially consis-
tent with what little guidance the Supreme Court has provided in 
these cases—and, as importantly, that have the general endorsement 
of virtually all of the district judges and the executive branch.  That is 
by no means to commend these decisions, but rather to suggest that, 
if nothing else, fealty to precedent is not one of their shortcomings. 
I. SCOPE OF DETENTION AUTHORITY 
One of the most significant substantive questions at issue in the 
post-Boumediene habeas cases is the scope of the government’s deten-
tion authority.  It is also the issue on which the Supreme Court has 
arguably provided the least amount of illumination, whether in Bou-
mediene or any other terrorism-related case.  The touchstone, all 
(now) agree,
31
 is the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), which provides that 
 
 30 To take one obvious—but less significant—example, the Supreme Court in 
Boumediene expressly left intact the review process under the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148,119 Stat. 2680 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 10, 28 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)), even though it had held it to be an inade-
quate substitute for habeas.  The Court thereby suggested that appeals to the D.C. 
Circuit of decisions by Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) might provide 
the first avenue of review for most detainees, followed by habeas.  See Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (“[B]oth the DTA and the CSRT process remain in-
tact. . . . Except in cases of undue delay, federal courts should refrain from entertain-
ing an enemy combatant’s habeas corpus petition at least until after the Department, 
acting via the CSRT, has had a chance to review his status.”).  Nevertheless, in Bismul-
lah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the D.C. Circuit held that Boumediene 
necessarily abnegated the DTA process on its face, because, in the court of appeals’ 
view, Congress would not have wanted the two processes to exist in parallel.  Id. at 
1072–74.  
 31 At various points, the Bush administration argued that it had power to detain 
under both the Authorization for Use Military Force (AUMF) and the President’s 
inherent constitutional authority as commander-in-chief.  The Obama administra-
tion has refused to defend that position and has instead rested its detention argu-
ments entirely on the AUMF.  See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4 
(D.D.C. 2009).  See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Au-
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the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist at-
tacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such or-
ganizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of in-
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.
32
 
Whereas the AUMF does not speak specifically to detention au-
thority, the Supreme Court in Hamdi recognized that “[b]ecause de-
tention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a funda-
mental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary 
and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably autho-
rized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here,”
33
 (i.e., 
of “individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who 
‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’”).
34
  Telling-
ly, though, Justice O’Connor sounded a note of caution against read-
ing the AUMF too broadly.  As she wrote: 
[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of “ne-
cessary and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain 
for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is 
based on longstanding law-of-war principles.  If the practical cir-
cumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the 
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that 
understanding may unravel.
35
 
Other than these statements, nothing in Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, or 
Boumediene
 
speaks with any further clarity as to the sweep of the 
AUMF vis-à-vis detention.
36
 
 
thorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (arguing that the 
AUMF provides authority for most of the counterterrorism initiatives that the Bush 
administration had pegged to the President’s Article II powers). 
 32 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 
224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).  
 33 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 34 Id. at 521. 
 35 Id. 
 36 The various opinions produced by the en banc Fourth Circuit in the al-Marri 
case devote substantial attention to the proper scope of the AUMF.  al-Marri v. Puc-
ciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 
129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).  In that case, though, the issue went to the scope of the 
AUMF as applied to a non-citizen lawfully present within the United States at the 
time of his initial arrest.  Although it would follow a fortiori that the authority recog-
nized in al-Marri would apply at Guantánamo, it does not necessarily follow that the 
constraints on the AUMF identified there would apply to non-citizens initially arrested 
and detained outside the territorial United States.  
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 In Gherebi v. Obama, the D.C. District Court conducted an ex-
haustive analysis of Hamdi, the AUMF, and the laws of war, and con-
cluded that 
the President has the authority to detain persons who were part 
of, or substantially supported, the Taliban or al-Qaeda forces that 
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners, provided that the terms “substantially supported” and 
“part of” are interpreted to encompass only individuals who were 
members of the enemy organization’s armed forces, as that term 
is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their capture.
37
 
Thus, the relevant question was whether the detainee was “part of or 
substantially supported” the Taliban or al Qaeda, so long as either of 
those criteria necessarily established that the detainee was in fact a 
member of either organization’s armed forces when arrested.  With-
out that latter qualification, Gherebi suggested that detention would 
be inconsistent with the laws of war, at least insofar as principles go-
verning international armed conflict (IAC) might apply to the non-
international armed conflict (NIAC) with al Qaeda.
38
  Because Hamdi 
and Hamdan had both instructed that the AUMF should be read in 
concert with the laws of war (indeed, in Hamdi, that had been the ba-
sis for the plurality’s conclusion that the AUMF authorized deten-
tion),
39
 Gherebi thereby effectively limited the scope of the AUMF to 
detention generally in conformity with law-of-war principles govern-
ing IAC. 
Although some D.C. district judges reached divergent conclu-
sions concerning the precise scope of the government’s detention 
 
 37 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 71 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 38 To be sure, it is hardly settled that IAC detention principles necessarily apply 
in the context of NIAC.  Indeed, a number of prominent international humanitarian 
law scholars argue that NIAC provides no detention authority whatsoever—that, in 
the case of NIAC, detention authority must come, if at all, from domestic law.  See, 
e.g., Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of U.S. Practice Relating to “Enemy Combatants,” 10 Y.B. 
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 232, 278 (2009); see also Azmy, supra note 17, at 501 n.290 
(collecting sources).  But see Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Con-
flict, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2009) (arguing that detention that is legal during IAC 
should also be legal during NIAC).  I do not mean to delve into this important and 
intricate debate here other than to note that, for better or worse, both the D.C. Dis-
trict Court and the Obama administration have generally proceeded on this assump-
tion—that, where an individual can be detained under IAC rules, it should follow 
that he can be detained in a NIAC regime, as well.  
 39 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2006); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519–
21(plurality opinion). 
VLADECK FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:40 PM 
2011] D.C. CIRCUIT AFTER BOUMEDIENE 1459 
 
power,
40
 Judge Walton’s analysis in Gherebi provided a useful frame-
work within which to situate the analysis, at least in the short term.
41
  
That changed with the D.C. Circuit’s first merits decision in a post-
Boumediene Guantánamo habeas case, Al-Bihani v. Obama.
42
 
For this discussion, two of Al-Bihani’s holdings are key.  First, 
writing for herself and Judge Kavanaugh, Judge Brown expressly re-
jected the notion that the laws of war had any bearing on the scope of 
the government’s detention authority.
43
  Offering the generally un-
controversial suggestion that “Congress had the power to authorize 
the President in the AUMF and other later statutes to exceed [the 
bounds of international law],”
44
 Judge Brown did not address whether 
Congress in the AUMF had in fact expressly departed from interna-
tional law.  Instead, she simply asserted that, 
while the international laws of war are helpful to courts when 
identifying the general set of war powers to which the AUMF 
speaks, their lack of controlling legal force and firm definition 
render their use both inapposite and inadvisable when courts 
seek to determine the limits of the President’s war powers.
45
 
In other words, Judge Brown appeared to suggest that because 
the laws of war are not precise when it comes to delineating the scope 
of detention authority, Congress must not have intended to incorpo-
rate law-of-war principles, despite both (1) the canon of statutory in-
terpretation pursuant to which statutes are presumed to be consistent 
with international law; and (2) the specific language of Hamdi read-
ing the AUMF in exactly that manner.
46
 
Second, without international law to inform the scope of the 
AUMF, Judge Brown turned to domestic law—and to other statutes 
that might bear on the scope of the government’s detention power.  
In particular, the Al-Bihani panel seized on the Military Commissions 
 
 40 See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73–77 (D.D.C. 2009).  See gener-
ally Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held?: Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 
52 B.C. L. REV. 769 (2011). 
 41 See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 40, at 831–36. 
 42 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
 43 Id. at 868–81. 
 44 Id. at 871. 
 45 Id.  In her concurring opinion, Judge Brown elaborated upon her critique of 
the utility of international law.  Id. at 882 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 46 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
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Act of 2006 (MCA),
47
 and its definition of who may be tried before a 
military commission.
48
  As Judge Brown explained, 
Congress, in the 2006 MCA, provided guidance on the class of 
persons subject to detention under the AUMF by defining “unlaw-
ful enemy combatants” who can be tried by military commission.  
The 2006 MCA authorized the trial of an individual who “engaged 
in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported 
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is 
not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of 
the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces).” . . . The provisions 
of the 2006 and 2009 MCAs are illuminating in this case because 
the government’s detention authority logically covers a category 
of persons no narrower than is covered by its military commission 
authority. . . . [I]t is enough to recognize that any person subject 
to a military commission trial is also subject to detention, and that 
category of persons includes those who are part of forces asso-
ciated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully 
and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coali-
tion partners.
49
 
The above-quoted passage is telling in three equally important—
yet distinct—respects.  First, it hardly follows that those who can law-
fully be tried by a military commission are a proper subset of those 
who can be detained without trial.  After all, under the laws of war, 
those held without charges and military commission defendants are 
two very different categories of detainees whose status presents two 
distinct sets of questions. 
Second, even if the panel’s conclusion could follow in the ab-
stract, the MCA’s legislative history is quite clear that Congress in no 
way intended to impact the substantive scope of the AUMF in defin-
ing who could be tried by a military commission.  For example, the 
House Armed Services Committee Report that accompanied the 2006 
MCA expressly noted that the divergence between the AUMF and 
MCA definitions reflected the committee’s disagreement that “the 
United States must be engaged in armed conflict to try an alien un-
lawful enemy combatant engaged in hostilities against the United 
States,”
50
 even though Hamdi appeared to require an armed conflict 
 
 47 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).  
 48 See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2006). 
 49 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (citations omitted). 
 50 H.R. REP. No. 109-664, pt. 1, at 6 (2006). 
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to justify detention without trial.
51
  So construed, the difference be-
tween the MCA and the AUMF reflected Congress’s choice to incor-
porate the different standards and rules applicable to military trials as 
contrasted with noncriminal detention under the laws of war.  Thus, 
it is not only a logical fallacy to read the MCA as expanding the scope 
of the AUMF’s detention authority; it also runs directly counter to the 
intent of those who wrote the latter statute.
52
 
Even if that point was only implicit with respect to the 2006 
MCA, Congress made the point explicit in the wholesale 2009 
amendments to the MCA.
53
  Thus, the Conference Report accompa-
nying the 2009 MCA provides that the definition of who may be tried 
by a military commission 
is included for the purpose of establishing persons subject to trial 
by military commission in accordance with section 948c, of title 
10, United States Code, and is not intended to address the scope 
of the authority of the United States to detain individuals in ac-
cordance with the laws of war or for any other purpose.
54
 
Given this language, it is incredibly difficult to understand how Judge 
Brown could conclude that the MCA informed (and perhaps even 
expanded) the scope of the AUMF’s detention authority.
55
  One poss-
ible justification might be that Judge Walton’s definition in Gherebi 
incorporated the idea of detainees “substantially supporting” al Qae-
da or the Taliban.  Thus, the argument goes, there is not much day-
light between a definition that relies upon “substantial” support and 
one that instead requires the detainee to have been “purposefully 
and materially supporting” those groups.  But the point in Gherebi was 
to recognize substantial support as a basis for detention to the extent 
 
 51 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.  
 52 See Steve Vladeck, Judge Randolph Pulls Another Fast One—But Will Anyone Notice?, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 19, 2011, 4:03 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/02/ 
judge-randolph-pulls-another-fast-one-but-will-anyone-notice.html.  
 53 Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (codified in scattered 
sections of 10 U.S.C.).  
 54 H.R. REP. No. 111-288, at 862–63 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 55 In the district court’s decision in the Boumediene case, Judge Leon held that the 
AUMF authorized detention of an “individual who was part of or supporting Taliban 
or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners.”  Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 
135 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasis added).  But there is a world of difference between 
“supporting . . . hostilities,” which both the Boumediene and Gherebi definitions en-
compassed, and “providing material support,” a statutory term of art that sweeps far 
more broadly than acts of belligerency during an international or non-international 
armed conflict. 
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it was consistent with what the laws of war authorized in the context of 
IAC.
56
 
In light of Judge Brown’s rejection of the laws of war as a con-
straint on the AUMF, “purposeful and material support” would pre-
sumably have the sweeping meaning that material support has under 
U.S. domestic criminal law.
57
  The necessary implication would be 
that anyone who could be prosecuted for violating the federal ma-
terial support statute
58
 for services provided to al Qaeda or the Tali-
ban could also be detained indefinitely at Guantánamo, regardless of 
whether he or she might be subject to detention under the laws of 
war.  As Judge Williams pointed out in his narrower opinion concur-
ring in the judgment, not even the executive branch defended such a 
limitless proposition.
59
 
Third, and just as importantly, although the MCA’s standard ap-
plied to non-citizens who engaged in hostilities or provided material 
support, the Al-Bihani panel included in the former category the 
proposition that being “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban was suffi-
cient to render an individual subject to detention, regardless of wheth-
er that individual had actually engaged in any acts of belligerency 
against the United States.
60
  In so holding, Al-Bihani rejected the 
“command-structure” test that had been adopted by a number of dis-
trict judges in giving content to the term “part of,”
61
 under which the 
question was “whether [the detainee] receives and executes orders or 
directions”
62
 from—and not just whether he was “part of”—al Qaeda 
or the Taliban.
63
  To be sure, in many (if not most) cases, these two 
standards will dovetail.  But when they do not (i.e., when a detainee 
 
 56 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 57 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718–31 (2010) 
(upholding against constitutional challenge 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which makes it a 
crime to provide various forms of “material support,” including “training,” “person-
nel,” “services,” and “expert advice or assistance” to designated foreign terrorist or-
ganizations). 
 58 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006); see also 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2006 & Supp. 
III 2010) (defining “providing material support to terrorism” as a crime triable be-
fore a military commission).  
 59 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 883–86 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Williams, J., 
concurring in the judgment), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).  
 60 See id. at 872 (majority opinion). 
 61 E.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See e.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting Al-Bihani’s 
implicit repudiation of the “command structure” test), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 
(2011).  
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does not receive and execute orders or directions from al Qaeda or 
the Taliban), it is difficult to see how the detainee could properly be 
a belligerent under the laws of war. 
In light of these holdings, a concerted effort was made to ask the 
entire D.C. Circuit to rehear Al-Bihani en banc.  Formally, the court 
of appeals disagreed.
64
  But in a curious statement co-authored by the 
court’s seven active judges other than Judges Brown and Kavanaugh 
(the two active judges on the Al-Bihani panel), the judges explained 
that 
we decline to en banc this case to determine the role of interna-
tional law-of-war principles in interpreting the AUMF because, as 
the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s dis-
cussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the 
merits.
65
 
In other words, even while declining to rehear the case en banc, the 
rest of the D.C. Circuit effectively converted Al-Bihani’s controversial 
international law holding into dicta, a result that drew relatively sharp 
objections from Judge Brown (largely on process grounds)
66
 and 
Judge Kavanaugh (on substance).
67
  Perhaps as a result, in April 2011, 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
68
 
The (non-)en banc maneuvering in Al-Bihani therefore left open 
the question of whether international law should bear on the scope 
of the AUMF, a point to which the court of appeals has not yet re-
turned.
69
  One might also have assumed that the panel’s MCA-based 
 
 64 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (mem.) 
 65 Id. at 1 (Sentelle, C.J., and Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland, & 
Griffith, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).  
 66 Id. at 1–9 (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 67 Id. at 9–56 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).  In 
addition to providing the strongest defense of the panel’s conclusion that the AUMF 
should not be interpreted in a manner consistent with the laws of war, Judge Kava-
naugh’s concurrence also offered the unorthodox (and, to my knowledge, unprece-
dented) argument that “war-authorizing statute[s]” in general are uniquely poor 
candidates for the “Charming Betsy canon” and should never be interpreted 
“to . . . conform with non-self-executing treaties and customary international law.”  
Id. at 38.  Whatever else may be said about this theory (which may well merit a paper 
unto itself), it suffices for present purposes to note the inconsistency between such 
analysis and the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.  
 68 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.). 
 69 In one curious unreported decision, Judges Ginsburg, Garland, and Williams 
remanded a case to the district court based on the detainee’s claim that, as a medic, 
his detention was barred by Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention.  Al-Warafi v. 
Obama, 409 F. App’x 360, 360–61 (D.C. Cir.  2011) (per curiam); see also Al-Warafi v. 
Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2010).  Presumably, the remand order necessari-
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analysis of the scope of detention power was also vitiated by the  
(non-)en banc order, since the panel might not have looked to do-
mestic law if international law provided useful criteria.  Nevertheless, 
a different three-judge panel (Judges Henderson, Williams, and Ran-
dolph) reaffirmed the MCA-grounded reading of the AUMF in Feb-
ruary 2011 in their remand order in Hatim v. Gates.
70
  As that panel 
wrote: 
[T]he district court ruled that the military could detain only indi-
viduals who were “part of” al-Qaida or the Taliban . . . .  That rul-
ing is directly contrary to Al-Bihani v. Obama, which held that 
“those who purposefully and materially support” al-Qaida or the 
Taliban could also be detained.
71
 
In other words, to whatever extent the rest of the D.C. Circuit had 
mooted the international law discussion in Al-Bihani, Hatim suggests 
that it remains enough in a habeas case for the government to show 
that a detainee, though not “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban, “pur-
posefully and materially supported” them.
72
 
To be sure, there has not yet been a single case in which deten-
tion authority ultimately rested solely on support, rather than mem-
bership.  But given both (1) the open questions surrounding “ma-
terial support” as a basis for the exercise of military jurisdiction
73
 and 
(2) the extent to which the scope of the AUMF has relevance far 
afield of Guantánamo detention cases,
74
 this distinction matters—and 
quite a bit, at that. 
And as for Boumediene, it is certainly true that nothing in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court spoke at all to the appropriate scope 
of the government’s detention authority. Nor did anything in that 
 
ly accepts that Article 24 might bar the petitioner’s detention if he can make the rele-
vant factual showings—or, at least, that the AUMF would not authorize detention in-
consistent with Article 24. See First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 24, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
 70 632 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 71 Id. at 721 (emphasis added). 
 72 Id.  See also Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1073–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(quoting the Al-Bihani standard with approval).  But see Al-Alwi v. Obama, No. 09-
5125, 2011 WL 2937134, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011) (citing with approval the gov-
ernment’s proffered standard, pursuant to which it may only detain an individual 
who was “part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition part-
ners” (emphasis omitted)).  
 73 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 13. 
 74 See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 40. 
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case (or any other) undermine Judge Brown’s reading of the MCA; 
the flaw in her analysis on that point derives wholly from her misread-
ing of congressional intent.
75
  But to the extent that the Supreme 
Court in Hamdi and Hamdan commanded that the AUMF be inter-
preted in a manner that conforms with the international law govern-
ing traditional IAC,
76
 the argument that the reasoning in Al-Bihani is 
subverting the Supreme Court is on somewhat firmer footing.  After 
all, if principles of IAC should inform the scope of the government’s 
detention authority in the NIAC with al Qaeda, any reading of the 
government’s detention authority that would allow detention based 
purely on support (or on membership without being part of the 
“command structure”), and without any showing of belligerency or 
direct participation in hostilities, may well contravene those prin-
ciples.
77
  Inasmuch as the seven-judge statement in Al-Bihani all but 
eliminated the holding that was directly irreconcilable with the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence in that regard, then, the “purposeful 
and material support” standard adopted in Al-Bihani and reaffirmed 
in Hatim could quite easily authorize detention that is inconsistent 
with what the laws of war have traditionally contemplated—and, as 
such, what the Court’s precedents (Hamdi, in particular) appear to 
allow. 
 
 75 See supra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
 76 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)(plurality opinion)(describing 
the President’s detention authority under the AUMF as “based on longstanding law-
of-war principles”); id. at 548 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he military and its Commander in Chief are au-
thorized to deal with enemy belligerents according to . . . the laws of war.”); see also 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2006) (noting that the AUMF, among 
other statutes governing military commissions, must be interpreted by reference to 
the laws of war).  It bears emphasizing that, in Hamdi, the conclusion that the laws of 
war informed the scope of the AUMF were crucial to the plurality’s holding that the 
AUMF authorized Hamdi’s detention; without such a reading, the AUMF might not 
have satisfied the Non-Detention Act.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 547–48 (Souter, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(a) (2006).  Thus, it is particularly ironic to conclude that Hamdi does not re-
quire reading the AUMF in light of international law principles, given that, without 
those principles, Hamdi’s detention may well have been barred. 
 77 As my friend and colleague Bobby Chesney has pointed out, another possible 
detention model that could incorporate material support as a basis for detention is 
the security internment model provided by the Fourth Geneva Convention.  Ches-
ney, supra note 40.  If that regime could apply in the context of a non-international 
armed conflict, then there very well might be authority to detain individuals based 
purely on non-belligerent acts of support to parties to the NIAC.  The flip side, of 
course, is that such a detention regime would be necessarily limited by necessity and 
would require periodic review—and, in any event, is not what the U.S. government 
has ever pursued under the AUMF. 
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II. EVIDENTIARY BURDENS AND PRESUMPTIONS 
As noted above, although the current D.C. Circuit case law go-
verning the scope of the government’s detention power is troubling, 
the “material support” analysis has not yet had a meaningful impact 
on any individual cases.
78
  In marked contrast is the D.C. Circuit’s ju-
risprudence concerning the government’s burden of proof in post-
Boumediene habeas cases, and how that burden should affect district 
court assessments of the facts of individual detainees’ claims.  And 
once again, the fountainhead decision was Al-Bihani.  There, the 
court (as it did with respect to the government’s detention authority) 
reached two conclusions relevant here.  First, the panel agreed with 
the government that “preponderance of the evidence” is the appro-
priate burden of proof.
79
  Second, the panel also agreed that hearsay 
evidence should generally be admissible in these cases.
80
 
Before turning to Al-Bihani’s analysis, it is worth pausing for a 
moment to reflect on how the issue was framed in light of Boumediene.  
As Judge Brown wrote for the Al-Bihani panel: 
Habeas review for Guantanamo detainees need not match the 
procedures developed by Congress and the courts specifically for 
habeas challenges to criminal convictions.  Boumediene’s holding 
explicitly stated that habeas procedures for detainees “need not 
resemble a criminal trial.”  It instead invited “innovation” of ha-
beas procedure by lower courts, granting leeway for “[c]ertain ac-
commodations [to] be made to reduce the burden habeas corpus 
proceedings will place on the military.”  Boumediene’s holding 
therefore places Al-Bihani’s procedural argument on shaky 
ground.  The Suspension Clause protects only the fundamental 
character of habeas proceedings, and any argument equating that 
fundamental character with all the accoutrements of habeas for 
domestic criminal defendants is highly suspect.
81
 
In the passage from which Judge Brown was quoting, though, 
Boumediene was referring to the procedural protections that attach to 
criminal trials themselves, and not to “habeas challenges to criminal 
convictions.”
82
  Nor is this a semantic distinction; it is hardly a contro-
versial proposition that contemporary criminal defendants are en-
 
 78 See supra text accompanying notes 72–73. 
 79 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 877–78 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1814 (2011). 
 80 Id. at 879. 
 81 Id. at 876 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 82 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008). 
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titled to far greater procedural protections in their trial and direct 
appeal than in any collateral challenges they mount thereto.  Never-
theless, Al-Bihani conflated the procedural protections afforded in ci-
vilian criminal trials with those available in criminal (post-conviction) 
habeas, suggesting that, because Boumediene held that Guantánamo 
habeas petitions need not have the protections attendant to criminal 
trials, they also need not have the (far lesser) protections attendant to 
post-conviction habeas petitions.
83
 
If anything, a closer read of Boumediene suggests that the oppo-
site should be true—that the Guantánamo detainees should receive 
more process than those who seek to use habeas collaterally to attack 
state-court convictions since their detention does not result from con-
victions obtained in a court of record, in which “considerable defe-
rence is owed to the court that ordered confinement.”
84
  Indeed, this 
idea is more than just a passing thought within the Court’s opinion in 
Boumediene.  As Justice Kennedy underscored in explaining why the 
review provided by the Detainee Treatment Act was inadequate, 
Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, 
after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral 
review is most pressing.  A criminal conviction in the usual course 
occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in 
the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its 
own independence.  These dynamics are not inherent in execu-
tive detention orders or executive review procedures.  In this con-
text the need for habeas corpus is more urgent.
85
 
From the start, then, Al-Bihani approached the issue of procedural 
protections from a flawed perspective, badly misreading Boumediene to 
suggest that Guantánamo detainees should receive less process, not 
more, than those seeking to attack convictions collaterally in civilian 
courts .  Given Justice Kennedy’s repeated allusions in Boumediene to 
the distinct considerations governing judicial review of executive de-
tention and collateral review of state and federal convictions,
86
 it is 
 
 83 See Steve Vladeck, Judge Brown’s Sleight-of-Hand in Al-Bihani—and Why It Matters, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (May 14, 2010, 10:07 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/05/judge-browns-sleightofhand-
in-albihaniand-why-it-matters.html.  
 84 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782.  
 85 Id. at 783.  In this respect, Boumediene has much in common with Justice Frank-
furter’s important discussion of the different goals of collateral review in Burns v. 
Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 845–52 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing). 
 86 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783–87. 
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difficult to understand how this point could so easily have been 
missed. 
Nonetheless, and in light of these observations, the Al-Bihani 
panel went on to conclude that “preponderance of the evidence” is 
the appropriate burden of proof in Guantánamo habeas cases, em-
phasizing that it was not deciding that the Constitution required such a 
standard,
87
 but only that it seemed consistent with Hamdi—and was 
not unconstitutional—to so hold.
88
  In addition, the panel concluded 
that “the question a habeas court must ask when presented with hear-
say is not whether it is admissible—it is always admissible—but what 
probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhi-
bits.”
89
 
As to both the burden of proof and the admissibility vel non of 
hearsay, much of Al-Bihani’s reasoning seems at least superficially 
compatible with Hamdi and Boumediene, on both of which the court of 
appeals (at least here) heavily relied.
90
  Indeed, other than Judge 
Brown’s hint that the Constitution might not require a “preponder-
ance” standard, it would not be until later cases that the D.C. Circuit 
would adopt views of these holdings that strained their jurispruden-
tial foundations and further manifested the error in Judge Brown’s 
threshold framing of the procedural protections to which the detai-
nees should be entitled.
91
 
In particular, four merits decisions from the summer of 2010 
stand out.
92
  In a trio of decisions handed down in June, three differ-
ent panels affirmed district court denials of habeas relief, reaffirming 
that (1) preponderance is the governing burden of proof; (2) hearsay 
is admissible; and (3) in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, 
the district court should not “weigh each piece of evidence in isola-
 
 87 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1814 (2011).  
 88 Id. at 878 & n.4. 
 89 Id. at 879; see also Khan v. Obama, No. 10-5306, 2011 WL 3890843, at *6–7 
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 6, 2011) (articulating the approach to be followed in assessing the 
reliability of hearsay statements). 
 90 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879–80.  
 91 Id. at 878. 
 92 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 
(2011); Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1812 (2011); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 
608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
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tion, but consider all of the evidence taken as a whole.”
93
  Given Al-
Bihani’s legal conclusions, and that review of factual findings was only 
for clear error, these results may have seemed particularly unremark-
able at the time and can probably be seen as the D.C. Circuit general-
ly coalescing around a series of rules that neither the district court 
nor the executive branch contested.  Instead, the real shift in ap-
proach came in the next decision on the merits, handed down by 
Judge Randolph in July 2010 in Al-Adahi v. Obama.
94
  Writing for him-
self and Judges Henderson and Kavanaugh, Judge Randolph for the 
first time reversed a district court’s grant of habeas relief in a post-
Boumediene detainee case.
95
 
At the outset, Judge Randolph devoted several pages to harsh 
criticism of both the district court and the government for not taking 
up the hints that the D.C. Circuit had dropped in Al-Bihani—and, to 
a lesser degree, in the June trilogy—that preponderance need not be 
the governing burden of proof.
96
  Suggesting that “we are aware of no 
precedents in which eighteenth century English courts adopted a 
preponderance standard,”
97
 Judge Randolph went on to highlight 
other contexts in which detention is based on a showing less than 
preponderance, including detention pending deportation, chal-
lenges to selective service decisions, challenges to convictions by 
court-martial, and challenges to arrest prior to trial.
98
  Yet, because 
the government maintained that preponderance was “appropriate”: 
We are thus left with no adversary presentation on an important 
question affecting many pending cases in this court and in the 
district court.  Although we doubt, for the reasons stated above, 
that the Suspension Clause requires the use of the preponderance 
standard, we will not decide the question in this case.  As we did 
in Al-Bihani, we will assume arguendo that the government must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that Al-Adahi was part 
of al-Qaida.
99
 
Notwithstanding the examples marshaled by Judge Randolph 
(none of which, it should be noted, remotely resemble the potentially 
indefinite detention without trial at issue in the Guantánamo cases), 
 
 93 Awad, 608 F.3d at 6–7, 10; see also Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 13–15; Barhoumi, 609 
F.3d at 422–24. 
 94 Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d 1102. 
 95 Id. at 1111.  
 96 Id. at 1104. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1105. 
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the Al-Adahi panel’s frustration with the preponderance standard is, 
in many ways, frustration not with Boumediene, but with Hamdi.
100
  Af-
ter all, if Hamdi was clear about anything, it was that “some evidence,” 
which the Fourth Circuit had held was a sufficient quantum of 
proof,
101
 was a woefully inadequate basis on which to detain a U.S. cit-
izen without charges.  As Justice O’Connor wrote for the plurality, 
Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly 
unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any oppor-
tunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls 
constitutionally short.  As the Government itself has recognized, 
we have utilized the “some evidence” standard in the past as a 
standard of review, not as a standard of proof.  That is, it primarily 
has been employed by courts in examining an administrative 
record developed after an adversarial proceeding—one with 
process at least of the sort that we today hold is constitutionally 
mandated in the citizen enemy-combatant setting.  This standard 
therefore is ill suited to the situation in which a habeas petitioner 
has received no prior proceedings before any tribunal and had no 
prior opportunity to rebut the Executive’s factual assertions be-
fore a neutral decisionmaker.
102
 
There is, of course, an obvious distinction between Hamdi and 
the Guantánamo cases, (i.e., the citizenship of the detainee).  This 
distinction might help to explain Judge Silberman’s cryptic sugges-
tion in Almerfedi that Hamdi’s articulation of the preponderance stan-
dard was “to be sure considering due process limitations,”
103
 implying 
that such a standard might not be required in the absence of such li-
mitations.  But even if Hamdi does not settle that the Constitution re-
quires at least a preponderance standard in all cases of noncriminal 
military detention, it at least offers compelling reasons why the lesser 
 
 100 Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1104–05. 
 101 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003)(“Hamdi is not entitled 
to challenge the facts presented in the Mobbs declaration. Where, as here, a habeas 
petitioner has been designated an enemy combatant and it is undisputed that he was 
captured in an zone of active combat operations abroad, further judicial inquiry is 
unwarranted when the government has responded to the petition by setting forth 
factual assertions which would establish a legally valid basis for the petitioner’s deten-
tion.”), rev’d, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 102 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).  Although Jus-
tice O’Connor was writing for a plurality, Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in 
this part of the Court’s opinion notwithstanding their disagreement over whether the 
AUMF actually did authorize Hamdi’s detention.  Id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). 
 103 Almerfedi v. Obama, No. 10-5291, 2011 WL 2277607, at *4 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 
2011). 
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standard of “some evidence” would be inadequate, whether or not 
the detainee is protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.
104
  And yet, in its discussion of the appropriate burden of 
proof, Al-Adahi nowhere discusses, cites, or even alludes to Hamdi. 
Reluctantly accepting preponderance as the burden of proof, Al-
Adahi then turned to the sufficiency of the evidence, beginning by 
chastising the district court for its “failure to appreciate conditional 
probability analysis”
105
—that “although some events are independent  
(coin flips, for example), other events are dependent.”
106
  In short, 
the Al-Adahi panel castigated the district court for being far too skep-
tical of the government’s claims in these cases and for drawing far too 
many inferences in favor of the detainee’s view of the facts.
107
  As with 
many of the Guantánamo cases, it is difficult to adequately review the 
court’s factual analysis, since some of the key evidence is classified.
108
  
But Al-Adahi made explicit what the June trilogy had hinted at: from 
the D.C. Circuit’s perspective, the government’s evidence should be 
looked at as an aggregated whole, regardless of the unreliability of 
individual aspects thereof, and whether or not preponderance or 
“some evidence” was formally the “appropriate” standard to apply.
109
 
Thus, most of the merits cases since Al-Adahi have focused on 
whether the district court took Al-Adahi’s admonitions to heart.  In 
Salahi v. Obama, for example, Judge Tatel, writing for himself, Chief 
Judge Sentelle, and Judge Brown, vacated a grant of habeas relief and 
remanded for further evidence, directly invoking Al-Adahi’s criticisms 
of the district court’s approach to the facts.
110
  As Judge Tatel ex-
plained: 
Merely because a particular piece of evidence is insufficient, 
standing alone, to prove a particular point does not mean that the 
evidence “may be tossed aside and the next [piece of evidence] 
 
 104 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450.  In that vein, consider that the Department of Defense 
established CSRTs at Guantánamo on July 7, 2004, just nine days after the Supreme 
Court decided Hamdi, and long before any court had suggested that non-citizens de-
tained at Guantánamo might have the same constitutional rights as Hamdi.  But see 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the Guan-
tánamo detainees are not protected by the Due Process Clause), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 
1235 (2010) (per curiam).  
 105 Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. at 1111; Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 109 Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1111. 
 110 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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may be evaluated as if the first did not exist.”  The evidence must 
be considered in its entirety in determining whether the govern-
ment has satisfied its burden of proof.
111
 
This “mosaic” theory, as it has increasingly come to be known, 
may well be a problematic application of the preponderance stan-
dard.
112
  What cannot be gainsaid is that, with Judge Tatel’s tem-
pered—but important—endorsement in Salahi, it appears to have the 
backing of the entire D.C. Circuit.
113
 
One good example of this trend is the Hatim case already noted 
above.
114
  But taking things one step further, Judge Kavanaugh, writ-
ing for himself and Judges Garland and Griffith, reversed a grant of 
habeas relief in Uthman v. Obama and remanded with instructions to 
deny the petition,
115
 concluding that the evidence was clearly suffi-
cient—even though there were strong reasons to question whether 
the district court had adequately represented the countervailing evi-
dence supporting the detainee’s claim.
116
 
Perhaps the most telling reflection on Al-Adahi, though came in 
Esmail v. Obama, decided on April 8, 2011.
117
  The per curiam opinion 
for a panel comprised of Judges Tatel, Brown, and Silberman simply 
applied Al-Adahi and the June trilogy to explain why the facts did not 
counsel in favor of relief.
118
  What stands out, however, is the concur-
rence filed by Judge Silberman, in which he suggested that, in con-
trast to the occasional need in criminal cases to release defendants 
 
 111 Id. at 753 (quoting Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105). 
 112 The problem with the “mosaic” theory is simple to describe, but hard to prove.  
If there are reasons why individual pieces of evidence are insufficient to satisfy a 
“preponderance” standard, including a lack of reliability, those reasons do not dissi-
pate merely because there is additional evidence that suffers from comparable relia-
bility concerns.  Thus, whereas the whole may often be greater than the sum of its 
parts, it may just as easily represent the aggregation of unreliable evidence, which is 
no more reliable taken as a whole than the individual items were taken individually.  
And given that reliability determinations are invariably based on classified informa-
tion in these cases, the public record is a poor starting point for assessment of the 
D.C. Circuit’s work in this field. 
 113 Salahi, 625 F.3d at 746. 
 114 See Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 115 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 116 See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, In Gitmo Opinion, Two Versions of Reality, PROPUBLICA 
(Oct. 8, 2010, 8:34 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/in-gitmo-opinion-two-
versions-of-reality (contrasting the original opinion released by the district court in 
Uthman with an opinion released after the original was withdrawn and demonstrating 
the marked differences in the presentation of the facts). 
 117 639 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 118 Id. at 1076–77. 
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the judge knows to be guilty, “candor obliges me to admit that one 
cannot help but be conscious of the infinitely greater downside risk 
to our country, and its people, of an order releasing a detainee who is 
likely to return to terrorism.”
119
  As he continued: 
That means that there are powerful reasons for the government 
to rely on our opinion in Al-Adahi v. Obama, which persuasively 
explains that in a habeas corpus proceeding the preponderance 
of evidence standard that the government assumes binds it, is un-
necessary—and moreover, unrealistic.  I doubt any of my col-
leagues will vote to grant a petition if he or she believes that it is 
somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an 
active supporter.  Unless, of course, the Supreme Court were to 
adopt the preponderance of the evidence standard (which it is 
unlikely to do—taking a case might obligate it to assume direct 
responsibility for the consequences of Boumediene v. Bush).  But I, 
like my colleagues, certainly would release a petitioner against 
whom the government could not muster even “some evidence.”
120
 
Judge Silberman’s statement is remarkable on several levels.  
First, one might fairly read it as suggesting that he—and at least some 
of his colleagues—are in fact reviewing the government’s case only 
for “some evidence,” rather than the “more evidence than not” re-
quirement of the preponderance standard.
121
  Although the review 
conducted by the judges in Al-Adahi and its progeny may already have 
implied as much, it seems something else altogether for a judge to 
give voice to such a reality.  And, as noted above, the Supreme Court 
itself has provided strong reasons to doubt the sufficiency of “some 
evidence” in this context, whether a higher burden is constitutionally 
required or not.
122
 
More fundamentally, though, Judge Silberman’s concurrence 
(which goes on to describe the post-Boumediene litigation as a “cha-
rade prompted by the Supreme Court’s defiant—if only theoretical—
assertion of judicial supremacy”
123
 in Boumediene) reveals deep-seated 
opposition both to Boumediene itself and to the litigation it spawned.
124
  
 
 119 Id. at 1077 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 120 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 121 Id. at 1078. 
 122 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 123 Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1078 (Silberman, J., concurring).  
 124 For a variation on that theme, consider Judge Brown’s concurrence in Al-
Bihani, in which she asked rhetorically “whether a court-driven process is best suited 
to protecting both the rights of petitioners and the safety of our nation.”  Al-Bihani v. 
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
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Perhaps more so than any single analytical tension between the D.C. 
Circuit and the Supreme Court, such a frank concession gives the 
most substance to the charge that some of the D.C. Circuit’s judges 
are subverting or otherwise vitiating the effect of the Supreme 
Court’s 2008 decision.  After all, once the Boumediene Court held that 
the Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantánamo, the remaind-
er of its opinion was devoted to explaining why the CSRT process was 
procedurally inadequate as a substitute for habeas corpus.
125
  It may 
be a bit of a stretch to compare the scope of post-Boumediene habeas 
to the review that the D.C. Circuit was empowered to conduct under 
the DTA, but whether or not the comparison is apt, the point re-
mains that the D.C. Circuit’s post-Boumediene jurisprudence yields a 
landscape in which petitioners have limited prospects for success on 
the merits.  And if Judge Silberman is correct, only in cases in which 
there is virtually no evidence against the detainee, or at least no re-
motely credible evidence, would the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence 
clearly provide that the petitioner is likely to prevail.
126
  Presumably, 
the government would not even defend such cases—or, at the very 
least, would not appeal an adverse decision by the district court (as it 
has not with regard to twenty-nine of the thirty-eight detainees for 
whom the district court granted habeas relief).
127
 
To be clear, this is not an indictment of the D.C. Circuit writ 
large.  As noted above, the only judges who have openly criticized the 
preponderance standard in this manner are Judges Randolph and 
Silberman.
128
  Other than citing Al-Bihani’s reservation of whether the 
Constitution requires preponderance as a minimum burden of proof, 
the rest of the D.C. Circuit has—with the government’s encourage-
 
 125 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
 126 Thus, in Almerfedi v. Obama, Judge Silberman reversed a grant of habeas relief 
at least in part based on his conclusion that the district court committed “clear error” 
in concluding that another Guantánamo detainee’s statements were unreliable “jail-
house gossip.”  No. 10-5291, 2011 WL 2277607, at *5 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2011). 
 127 The twenty-nine grants came in nine decisions.  See Abdah (Odaini) v. Obama, 
717 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2010); Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11 
(D.D.C. 2009); Al Halmandy v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009); Al Mutai-
ri v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. 
Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009); Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009); 
Gharani v Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. 
Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008) (ordering release of five detainees); In re Guantanamo 
Detainee Litig., 581 F.3d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) (ordering release of seventeen detainees).  
The government also dropped its appeals of two habeas grants while the appeals 
were pending.  See Mohammed v. Obama, No. 05-5224 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2011) 
(mem.); Basardh v. Gates, No. 09-5200 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 14, 2010) (mem.).  
 128 See supra notes 95–101, 118–21 and accompanying text. 
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ment—applied the preponderance standard without comment, and 
has effectively endorsed Judge Randolph’s “mosaic” approach articu-
lated in Al-Adahi.
129
 
As for Judges Randolph and Silberman’s position, it also bears 
noting that the Justices may well be acquiescing.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in Al-Adahi,
130
 Al-Bihani,
131
 Al Odah,
132
 and 
Awad,
133
 and each time without a registered dissent or a comment 
(other than to note Justice Kagan’s recusals in Al-Adahi and Al-
Bihani).  Indeed, because Justice Kagan was not recused in Al Odah 
and Awad, those denials cannot be explained simply as an attempt to 
avoid the four-four split on the merits that may otherwise have re-
sulted.
134
  Instead, these cases either suggest that there are not five 
Justices who disagree with the outcomes, or that the Court is suffering 
from a form of what Linda Greenhouse described as “Gitmo fati-
gue.”
135
  Either way, the effect, at least with respect to the procedural 
and evidentiary issues discussed above, is to give the D.C. Circuit the 
last—rather skeptical—word.  Certainly, the denials of certiorari 
hardly pass for proof of the Supreme Court’s approval of Judges Ran-
dolph and Silberman’s approach in this field.  But given that no 
other court is in a position to disagree with the D.C. Circuit on these 
issues,
136
 these denials are at least a tacit acquiescence in the status 
 
 129 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 130 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011) (mem.). 
 131 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.). 
 132 Al Odah v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011) (mem.). 
 133 Awad v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.). 
 134 Steve Vladeck, On Counting to Five (Without Justice Kagan) in the Guantanamo Cas-
es, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 12, 2011, 6:22 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/01/on-counting-to-five-without-
justice-kagan-in-the-guantanamo-cases.html.  
 135 Linda Greenhouse, Gitmo Fatigue at the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR 
(Apr. 6, 2011, 8:45 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/gitmo-
fatigue-at-the-supreme-court.  
 136 Curiously, in Al-Bihani, Judge Brown invoked the exclusivity of the D.C. courts’ 
jurisdiction as a shortcoming of the post-Boumediene process, since there would not be 
“a significant number of cases brought before a large set of courts.”  Al-Bihani v. Ob-
ama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1814 (2011).  Nevertheless, I think it is safe to conclude that her point was less 
that there should be additional courts with the power to hear these cases than that the 
whole post-Boumediene project is unwise. 
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quo,
137
 until and unless, as in Al-Bihani, the rest of the D.C. Circuit is 
motivated to respond. 
III. REMEDIES 
Perhaps the greatest public outcry concerning the D.C. Circuit’s 
post-Boumediene jurisprudence, though, has come in the context of 
remedies for those detainees who have been cleared (whether by the 
executive branch or a federal court) for release.
138
  Indeed, in Boume-
diene itself, one of the signal defects in the CSRT process that led Jus-
tice Kennedy to conclude that it was an inadequate substitute for ha-
beas corpus was the inability of the CSRT or the D.C. Circuit on 
appeal to effectuate a prevailing detainee’s release.
139
  If critics of the 
D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area are any guide, however, ha-
beas might not be any more effective. 
At the heart of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence concerning re-
medies for those detainees cleared for release are two cases, both of 
which involved Uighurs—ethnically Turkic Chinese Muslims—
detained at Guantánamo who could not be returned to China.
140
  In 
the D.C. Circuit’s only merits decision in a CSRT appeal, Judge Gar-
land, writing eight days after Boumediene (and joined by Chief Judge 
Sentelle and Judge Griffith), held that the government no longer had 
the authority to detain the Uighurs, and ordered their release “with-
out prejudice to [their] right to seek release immediately through a 
writ of habeas corpus in the district court, pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Boumediene.”
141
 
Following that suggestion, the Uighurs sought habeas relief.
142
  
The question that was thus raised in Kiyemba I was whether the detai-
nees had a right to be released into the United States if there was no 
other country to which they could be sent.
143
  Although the district 
court initially answered that question in the affirmative,
144
 the D.C. 
 
 137 See Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit in Control on Detainees, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 
2011, 9:36 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/04/dc-circuit-in-control-on-
detainees.  
 138 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  
 139 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–88 (2008). 
 140 See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 141 Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 142 Id. at 858. 
 143 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 144 In re Guantanamo Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub 
nom. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).  
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Circuit, in a harshly-worded opinion by Judge Randolph (joined by 
Judge Henderson, and with a partial concurrence by Judge Rogers), 
reversed.
145
 
Specifically, Judge Randolph’s analysis hinged on two distinct 
but related conclusions.  First, the federal courts in general lack the 
power to order the political branches to admit non-citizens into the 
territorial United States.
146
  And second, to whatever extent the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment might otherwise bar the po-
tentially indefinite detention that could result, it did not apply to 
non-citizens detained at Guantánamo, and therefore provided no ba-
sis for a right to release into the United States.
147
 
I have written elsewhere in some detail about Judge Randolph’s 
analysis, especially his rather crabbed understanding of the remedial 
powers of the habeas court.
148
  What is telling for present purposes 
about Kiyemba I is not the court’s debatable reliance on the Supreme 
Court’s 1950s-era immigration jurisprudence,
149
 but rather its due 
process analysis.  In particular, Judge Randolph explained that 
“[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court and of this court—decisions the 
district court did not acknowledge—hold that the due process clause 
does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sove-
reign territory of the United States.”
150
  What is striking about this 
passage is that, even as the opinion criticized the district court for 
failing to take heed of certain precedents, Judge Randolph himself 
failed to pay any attention to Boumediene, which, though not about the 
Due Process Clause, may well recalibrate the Court’s approach to 
whether all individual constitutional rights apply extraterritorially, in-
cluding whether the Guantánamo detainees are entitled to due 
process protections.
151
  Thus, Kiyemba I reached its due process hold-
 
 145 Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022.  
 146 Id. at 1027–29. 
 147 Id. at 1026–27. 
 148 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 971–
72 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 
(2010)). 
 149 Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1027–28 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Me-
zei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 
(1950)).  
 150 Id. at 1026. 
 151 See e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. 
Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009).  
VLADECK FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:40 PM 
1478 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1451 
 
ing by effectively ignoring Boumediene, and by relying on prior deci-
sions each of which Boumediene may have called into question.
152
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiyemba I and vacated 
and remanded in light of a suggestion by the Obama administration 
that the detainees had received a resettlement offer, which might the-
reby moot the controversy.
153
  On remand, the D.C. Circuit, in a per 
curiam opinion that was almost certainly written by Judge Randolph, 
effectively reinstated its original opinion, concluding that “[t]he 
posture of the case now is not materially different than it was when 
the case was first before us.”
154
  The second time around, the Supreme 
Court—with Justice Kagan recused—denied certiorari.
155
  Writing for 
himself and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, Justice 
Breyer concurred in the denial of certiorari, explaining that “[u]nder 
present circumstances, I see no Government-imposed obstacle to pe-
titioners’ timely release and appropriate resettlement.”
156
  The neces-
sary assumption undergirding this statement is that a bona fide reset-
tlement offer to any third-party country, or at least one in which the 
detainee does not fear abuse, is the only “release” that Boumediene re-
quires.  Even if that is true, that leaves open the question of the ap-
propriate remedy in a case “where no other remedy is available.”
157
 
In contrast to the unique nature of the issue in Kiyemba I, the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II)
158
 is far more 
significant in its sweep, especially in light of subsequent develop-
ments.  There, the question before the court was whether the federal 
courts have the power to require notice and a hearing before the 
government seeks to transfer a detainee to a third-party country.
159
  In 
effect, the detainees claimed that they should have an opportunity to 
contest such a transfer on the ground that they might be mistreated 
or simply subjected to proxy detention on behalf of the U.S. govern-
 
 152 See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1027–28 (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. 206; Knauff, 338 U.S. 
537). 
 153 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam). 
 154 Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba III), 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per cu-
riam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).  
 155 Kiyemba, 131 S. Ct. at 1631(Breyer, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).  
 156 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (per curiam). 
 157 Kiyemba, 131 S. Ct. at 1631 (Breyer, J., respecting the denial of certiora-
ri)(noting that this question had been the basis for the original grant of certiorari in 
Kiyemba I). 
 158 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010). 
 159 Id. at 511. 
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ment once they are transferred to that third-party country.
160
  Joined 
by Judge Kavanaugh, Judge Ginsburg rejected that view, reading the 
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Munaf v. Geren
161
 as standing for 
the proposition that, so long as the government avers that it does not 
transfer to torture, there is nothing for a federal habeas court to re-
view on the merits, and, as such, no need for notice or a hearing 
prior to the detainee’s removal.
162
  As he explained: 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Munaf precludes the district court 
from barring the transfer of a Guantanamo detainee on the 
ground that he is likely to be tortured or subject to further prose-
cution or detention in the recipient country.  The Government 
has declared its policy not to transfer a detainee to a country that 
likely will torture him, and the district court may not second-guess 
the Government’s assessment of that likelihood.
163
 
Judge Kavanaugh concurred separately,
164
 largely in response to 
Judge Griffith’s dissent—which argued both that the Suspension 
Clause unquestionably protected a detainee’s ability to object to his 
transfer or removal to another country in appropriate cases, and that 
the majority’s conclusion to the contrary was based on several fun-
damental misreadings of Munaf, which raised far more specific 
facts.
165
  As I have suggested in some detail elsewhere, there is much 
to commend Judge Griffith’s analysis on both points.
166
  In particular, 
Unlike in Munaf, where the detainees [who were being held in 
Iraq] specifically sought to block their transfer to Iraqi custody on 
the merits, the petitioners in Kiyemba II sought an injunction only 
requiring notice and a hearing prior to their transfer to any coun-
try, to allow them to litigate the merits.  Nevertheless, the D.C. 
 
 160 Id. 
 161 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
 162 Tellingly, Judge Ginsburg specifically declined to rest on Kiyemba I’s holding 
that the detainees lack due process rights, even though that would have bolstered his 
analysis.  Instead, the Kiyemba II panel concluded that  
[e]ven assuming that the Guantanamo detainees, like the U.S. citizens 
in Munaf, possess constitutionally based due process rights with respect 
to transfers and that the Mathews/Hamdi balancing test applies, Munaf 
and other precedents preclude judicial second-guessing of the Execu-
tive’s considered judgment that a transfer is unlikely to result in tor-
ture.   
Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 518 n.4. 
 163 Id. at 516. 
 164 Id. at 516–22 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 165 Id. at 522–26 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 166 Vladeck, supra note 148, at 973–76. 
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Circuit majority concluded that “[u]nder Munaf . . . the district 
court may not question the Government’s determination that a 
potential recipient country is not likely to torture a detainee.”  
And although Judge Ginsburg’s opinion appeared to rest on the 
merits, rather than on the district court’s jurisdiction, that distinc-
tion effectively collapses in the face of the government’s blanket 
assertion that it does not ever transfer or otherwise repatriate de-
tainees to countries in which they are “more likely than not” to be 
tortured.
167
 
In effect, then, Kiyemba II turns the Supreme Court’s extradition-
centric analysis in Munaf into a categorical bar on review of any trans-
fer claim, including cases in which the detainee will face no criminal 
charges in the receiving country.  And even Munaf reserved the pos-
sibility of judicial review in a case where the detainee could prove that 
the government’s assertions about conditions in the receiving country 
were incorrect.
168
  Thus, it is not that Kiyemba II is inconsistent with, or 
a subversion of, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in any of the ter-
rorism cases.  If anything, Kiyemba II is a wholly unwarranted (and 
constitutionally problematic) expansion of the Court’s jurispru-
dence—Munaf, in particular.
169
 
To that end, although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Kiyemba II,
170
 detainees have continued to attempt to challenge its rea-
soning within the D.C. Circuit.  In Mohammed v. Obama, for example, 
an Algerian detainee claimed that Kiyemba II should not apply in his 
case because he feared mistreatment at the hands of a non-state ac-
tor, a possibility not covered by the State Department’s general aver-
ments with respect to the country conditions in Algeria.
171
  Judges 
Griffith and Kavanaugh rejected that distinction, even though Judge 
Tatel, in dissent, thought it to be potentially dispositive.
172
  And Jus-
 
 167 Id. at 974 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 168 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 703 & n.6 (2008); see also id. at 706–07 (Souter, 
J., concurring) (noting the limits of the Court’s holding and the eight distinct factual 
conditions on which it rests). 
 169 For an important counterexample, consider the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Khouzam v. Attorney General, which held that it violated due process to deny to a non-
citizen facing removal a meaningful opportunity to contest diplomatic assurances 
that he would not face torture if deported.  549 F.3d 235, 259 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 170 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010) (mem.). 
 171 Mohammed v. Obama, No. 10-5218, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16023 (D.C. Cir. 
July 8, 2010) (mem.).  
 172 Id. at *6 (Tatel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hile I agree 
with my colleagues that Kiyemba II compels us to reverse the district court with re-
spect to Mohammed’s allegations of torture by the Algerian government and the 
court’s intention to interrogate Ambassador Fried, I would remand to allow the gov-
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tice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, dissented 
from the Court’s denial of a stay in Mohammed’s case, suggesting 
that she “would grant the stay to afford the Court time to consider, in 
the ordinary course, important questions raised in this case and not 
resolved in Munaf v. Geren.”
173
  Nevertheless, Mohammed was involun-
tarily repatriated to Algeria.
174
 
And in Abdah v. Obama, the petitioner sought to have his case 
heard en banc as an initial matter, in an attempt to have the entire 
D.C. Circuit reconsider Kiyemba II.
175
  That maneuver failed, though, 
as the D.C. Circuit voted six-three not to hear the case en banc, with 
Judge Griffith, joined by Judges Rogers and Tatel, dissenting.
176
  For 
the time being, then, it seems as if Kiyemba II—and its troubling mi-
sreading of Munaf—will remain settled precedent,
177
 so much so that 
citations thereto can now be found in ordinary immigration and 
extradition cases.
178
 
The real damage wrought by Kiyemba II, though, is best unders-
tood in light of a subsequent decision by the same three judges: Omar 
v. McHugh.
179
  Omar (in which the detainee was one of the petitioners 
in Munaf) raised the constitutional question that Munaf and Kiyemba 
II had both left open: whether the Suspension Clause protected a de-
tainee’s right to claim that his transfer from the United States to for-
eign custody violated the U.N. Convention Against Torture, and, as 
such, the federal statute implementing that treaty, the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA).
180
  Although the is-
 
ernment an opportunity to submit supplemental declarations as to whether, in decid-
ing it was safe to send Mohammed to Algeria, it considered potential threats posed 
by non-governmental entities.”). 
 173 Mohammed v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 32 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from the 
denial of stay) (citation omitted). 
 174 Mohammed v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (2011). 
 175 Abdah v. Obama, 630 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (mem.). 
 176 Id. at 1054 (Griffith, J., dissenting from the denial of initial en banc hearing) 
(“The question we face today is whether Guantanamo detainees are entitled to no-
tice of a transfer beyond the reach of the writ. If it seems odd that detainees in the 
War on Terror should enjoy such a right, they do so only because Boumediene ex-
tended habeas corpus to Guantanamo. We are bound to accept the consequences of 
that decision.”). 
 177 See, e.g., Khadr v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2900 (2011) (denying certiorari, over two 
dissents, in another case seeking to overturn Kiyemba II). 
 178 See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Benov, 395 F. App’x 329 (9th Cir. 2010); In re 
Extradition of Zhenly Ye Gon, 613 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2009).   
 179 646 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 180 Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–761.  FARRA implements Ar-
ticle 3 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture, under which “[n]o State Party shall 
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sue had been raised in both Munaf and Kiyemba II, neither the Su-
preme Court nor the Kiyemba II panel had reached it.  In Omar, then, 
the D.C. Circuit finally had to consider whether the REAL ID Act of 
2005, which takes away habeas jurisdiction over FARRA claims,
181
 
might violate the Suspension Clause in light of Boumediene. 
Writing for himself and Judge Ginsburg, Judge Kavanaugh ans-
wered that question in the negative.  Although his argument pro-
ceeded on a number of fronts, its core reduced to one of three prop-
ositions: either (1) FARRA was never meant to apply outside the 
context of immigration removal proceedings, and so there was no 
“right” to invoke in a habeas petition;
182
 (2) FARRA did confer such a 
right, but the REAL ID Act of 2005 repealed it;
183
 or (3) FARRA did 
confer such a right, but the REAL ID Act validly withdrew federal ha-
beas jurisdiction even as it left the statutory right intact.
184
 
As Judge Griffith explained in his concurrence,
185
 none of those 
analytical strands is convincing.  Virtually every circuit court to con-
sider the question had held, prior to the REAL ID Act, that FARRA 
could be invoked in habeas petitions, at least partly in light of the Sus-
 
expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture.”  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85.  
 181 Specifically, the REAL ID Act created 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4), which provides 
that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), 
including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provi-
sion, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for review filed 
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section 
shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or 
claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Oth-
er Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
except as provided in subsection (e) of this section. 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2006). 
 182 Omar, 646 F.3d at 17–18. 
 183 Id. at 22–23. 
 184 Id. at 24. 
 185 Although Judge Griffith sharply disagreed with the majority’s jurisdictional 
analysis, he concurred in the judgment based on the belief that Omar lost on the 
merits because FARRA does not confer a substantive right upon individuals who were 
already detained by the United States in the country the transfer to which they 
sought to enjoin.  See id. at 29 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Mu-
naf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 703 n.6 (2008) (suggesting this argument).  Whatever the 
merits of this view, it should be clear that it would affect a vanishingly small class of 
cases.  
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pension Clause concerns that might otherwise arise.
186
  Moreover, 
there is no support whatsoever in the REAL ID Act’s text or legislative 
history for the proposition that Congress meant to repeal the subs-
tantive right that FARRA had conferred.
187
 
But Omar’s true violence to precedent is the third holding—that 
the Suspension Clause does not prevent Congress from taking away 
habeas jurisdiction over statutory rights since Congress never had to 
create such a right in the first place (and could at any time repeal it).  
As Judge Kavanaugh put it, “Congress could constitutionally achieve 
the same result simply by declaring that the transfer policy itself ap-
plies only to immigration transferees.  The Constitution does not 
turn on such arcane and empty semantics.”
188
  The view that the Sus-
pension Clause does not protect statutory rights is belied by the his-
torical record and is flatly inconsistent with Boumediene and its proge-
ny—in which the bulk of the detainees’ claims were that their 
detention was inconsistent with the AUMF.
189
  As Judge Griffith con-
cluded, 
Congress can always repeal statutory rights or create new authori-
ty for detention, thereby limiting the range of habeas claims that 
federal prisoners may bring.  But that is not what Congress has 
done here.  It has not repealed section 2242(a), the ground for 
Omar’s claim, but has instead sought to limit his ability to bring 
his claim in federal court.  The majority counters that there is no 
real difference between expressly repealing a right and accom-
plishing the same end by stripping habeas jurisdiction.  I disagree.  
A core premise of the Suspension Clause is that the form of legis-
lative action can make a great deal of difference in terms of polit-
ical accountability: repealing a right tends to focus the public’s at-
tention in a way that the lawyerly maneuver of jurisdiction 
 
 186 See Omar, 646 F.3d at 25–26 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment).  See gen-
erally Stephen I. Vladeck, Case Comment, Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Suspension 
Clause After St. Cyr, 113 YALE L.J. 2007 (2004) (explaining why the Suspension Clause 
affected the courts’ analysis of FARRA).  
 187 See H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 176 (2005) (Conf. Rep.); see also Gerald L. Neu-
man, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 133, 137 n.17 (2006–2007) (“The Conference Report describes this provision as 
granting, rather than barring, a remedy.”). 
 188 Omar, 646 F.3d at 22; see also id. (“Because Omar has no constitutional right at 
stake here . . . Congress has no obligation to provide judicial review for the extra-
constitutional responsibilities the FARR Act imposes on the Executive Branch.”). 
 189 Indeed, Justice Kennedy in Boumediene specifically avoided holding that the de-
tainees had any constitutional rights.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet 
Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111–
12, 2112 nn.30–32 (2009).  
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stripping does not.  In fact, the Suspension Clause was inspired by 
Parliament’s use of jurisdiction stripping to prevent American 
prisoners from asserting their statutory and common law rights, 
and Alexander Hamilton thought that the Suspension Clause’s 
limits on jurisdiction stripping so enhanced the democratic check 
on wrongful detentions that it rendered a bill of rights unneces-
sary.  The Constitution vests in Congress the power to deprive 
prisoners of judicially enforceable rights, but “requires that it be 
made to say so unmistakably” by either suspending the writ or re-
pealing the right “so that the people will understand and the po-
litical check can operate.”
190
 
The majority’s response was to suggest that the Suspension 
Clause distinguished between challenges to the “positive legal author-
ity” for the detention and statutory rights against detention.
191
  But 
again, as Judge Griffith pointed out, such a distinction is unpersua-
sive on its face,
192
 and is in any event inconsistent with a host of Su-
preme Court decisions treating the two classes of challenges identi-
cally for Suspension Clause purposes, including Boumediene and INS v. 
St. Cyr.
193
  Thus, to the extent that Omar turned on this constitutional 
holding, it seems utterly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s guid-
ance in the field. 
Practically, the upshot of these cases is fairly straightforward.  Re-
lease from custody for Guantánamo detainees will basically be a mat-
ter of executive discretion in two directions: discretion under Kiyemba 
I to offer resettlement to only one or a small handful of countries to 
detainees who cannot be returned to their homes, and discretion un-
der Kiyemba II to involuntarily repatriate those who can.  These devel-
opments prompted the New York Times in March to view these cases as 
standing for the proposition that “[t]he appellate court has all but 
nullified that view of judicial power and responsibility backed by Jus-
tice Kennedy and the court majority” in Boumediene.
194
 
In my view, the Times’ assertion  is a bit of an overstatement as 
applied to Kiyemba I and Kiyemba II, but not to the subsequent deci-
sion in Omar.  Yes, Kiyemba I’s cursory due process analysis is blatantly 
 
 190 Omar, 646 F.3d at 29 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Henry 
M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise 
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1399 (1953)) (citations omitted).  
 191 Id. at 24 (majority opinion). 
 192 Id. at 28 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he difference seems to 
me no more than ‘empty semantics.’”).  
 193 Id. at 28–29 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001)). 
 194 A Right Without a Remedy, supra note 3. 
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inconsistent with Boumediene.  But, it may still be the case that, proper-
ly understood, the Guantánamo detainees’ due process rights do 
(and would) not include a right to be released into the United States.  
Instead, the true shortcoming in Kiyemba I is a failure of imagina-
tion—the categorical unwillingness of Judge Randolph to consider 
other permissible means by which federal courts might use their 
powers to effectuate a detainee’s immediate release, including the 
route embraced by the Second Circuit in Padilla v. Rumsfeld (i.e., an 
order demanding that the detainee be released or indicted on crimi-
nal charges within thirty days).
195
  The flaw in Kiyemba I, then, is not in 
subverting the letter of Boumediene or other Supreme Court decisions, 
but the spirit thereof.
196
 
And the case for Kiyemba II as a subversion of the Court is even 
trickier.  Yes, the D.C. Circuit erroneously extended Munaf into a 
context in which it was never meant to apply.
197
  This is an egre-
gious—and, as noted above, deeply problematic—error.  But the only 
way in which Kiyemba II flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent 
is in the extent to which the panel refused to take seriously Boume-
diene’s endorsement of analyzing the substantive scope of the Suspen-
sion Clause in light of what was true in English practice at the time of 
the Founding (the focus of Judge Griffith’s dissents from both the 
panel opinion and the decision not to hear Abdah en banc).  Nothing 
in Boumediene itself directly implies that Kiyemba II is wrong; only a 
proper understanding of English history does.
198
  Thus, unlike in Al-
Bihani, where the D.C. Circuit ultimately voted seven-two to limit the 
scope of the original panel’s holding, the attempt to accomplish the 
same result vis-à-vis Kiyemba II failed six-three in Abdah.
199
 
But the same cannot be said for Omar. Although I elsewhere de-
vote far more detail to the decision, its background, and its implica-
tions,
200
 the relevant point for present purposes is that unlike Kiyemba 
II, Omar does actively undermine Boumediene by holding that Congress 
has the power to deprive federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over 
certain types of statutory claims even as it leaves those rights intact.  It 
 
 195 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 542 
U.S. 426 (2004). 
 196 See Vladeck, supra note 148, at 971–72. 
 197 See supra note 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 198 See Vladeck, supra note 148, at 973–75. 
 199 See supra notes 167–16868 and accompanying text. 
 200 Stephen I. Vladeck, Normalizing Guantánamo, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2011). 
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may be ironic that the most violence that the D.C. Circuit has done to 
Boumediene has been in a non-Guantánamo case, but that may only 
increase—rather than mitigate—the reach of Omar’s misreading. 
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not also mention two addition-
al categories of “remedies” cases—those in which former Guantána-
mo detainees have sought damages arising out of allegedly abusive 
treatment while at Guantánamo and those in which former detainees 
have sought to conclusively establish the legality of their detention 
(or lack thereof) after they have been released. 
With regard to damages claims, initially, the D.C. Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s dismissal of such suits in light of its then-
extant holding that the Guantánamo detainees have no constitutional 
rights whatsoever,
201
 and therefore no rights that could give rise to a 
viable damages claim.
202
  Shortly after Boumediene, though, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, vacated that decision, and remanded 
with instructions to reconsider in light of Boumediene.
203
 
On remand, a D.C. Circuit panel consisting of Judges Hender-
son, Brown, and Randolph once again held that the detainees could 
not state a viable claim, concluding that “the Court in Boumediene dis-
claimed any intention to disturb existing law governing the extraterri-
torial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspen-
sion Clause.”
204
  Thus, the court rested on the alternative holdings 
that (1) the defendant officers were all entitled to qualified immuni-
ty,
205
 or (2) “special factors” counseled against inferring a Bivens cause 
of action.
206
  As I have explained elsewhere,
207
 this second holding is 
part of a problematic larger pattern, endorsed (at least implicitly) by 
the Supreme Court, in which lower courts have taken an unjustifiably 
narrow view of the availability of Bivens remedies in national security 
cases, even where other issues, such as qualified immunity or the state 
 
 201 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 202 Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 
(2008). 
 203 Rasul, 129 S. Ct. at 763.  
 204 Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).  
 205 Id. at 530 (“No reasonable government official would have been on notice that 
plaintiffs had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights.”). 
 206 Id. at 532 n.5. 
 207 See Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010) (criticizing the reliance on amorphous national security 
considerations in decisions like Rasul to justify not inferring a Bivens remedy).  
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secrets privilege, would likely stand in the way of relief.
208
  In light of 
that pattern, it hardly seems surprising that, this time around, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
209
  To similar effect, the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Ali v. Rumsfeld affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a series 
of damages suits brought by individuals detained by the United States 
in either Iraq or Afghanistan who claimed that they, too, were mi-
streated while in custody.
210
  Although the panel (Chief Judge Sen-
telle and Judges Henderson and Edwards) divided on the plaintiffs’ 
claims under the Alien Tort Statute,
211
 the judges unanimously agreed 
that the plaintiffs’ Bivens and declaratory relief claims were barred by 
either of the two holdings in Rasul II.
212
 
The unlikelihood of damages relief for former detainees pro-
vides a helpful segue to the final category of “remedies” cases—those 
in which individuals seek to obtain final adjudication of their habeas 
petition even after they have been released, if for no other reason 
than because of the potential collateral consequences that might oth-
erwise result from their detention.  In Gul v. Obama, however, Judge 
Ginsburg (writing for himself and Judges Tatel and Brown) con-
cluded that the detainees’ release had in fact mooted their claims, at 
least largely because the collateral consequences the detainees sought 
to mitigate were either too speculative or unlikely to be redressed by 
a favorable decision on the merits.
213
  The combined effect of Rasul II 
and Gul is certainly frustrating, since it means that those detainees 
who are released without a court order to that effect will almost never 
be able to obtain adjudication of whether their detention had ever 
been lawful.  As Judge Ginsburg explained, though, the Supreme 
Court has consistently narrowed the scope of the collateral conse-
 
 208 For perhaps the most distressing example of this trend, see Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 
F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).  
 209 Indeed, I think it is safe to conclude that the entire purpose of footnote five in 
Rasul II was to insulate the court’s qualified immunity discussion from Supreme 
Court review.  Given the court’s suggestion that “Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims are there-
fore foreclosed on this alternative basis, which is also unaffected by the Supreme 
Court’s Boumediene decision,” 563 F.3d at 532 n.5, there would have been little reason 
for the Justices to second-guess the panel’s first holding. 
 210 No. 07-5178, 2011 WL 2462851 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011). 
 211 Compare id. at *7–9, with id. at *10–26 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
 212 Id. at *5–7 (majority opinion); id. at *10 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“I do not 
disagree with the court’s judgment dismissing appellants’ Bivens claims and their 
claims for declaratory relief.”). 
 213 No. 10-5117, 2011 WL 2937166, at *8 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011). 
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quences doctrine in recent years
214
—including in cases where the 
consequences were far more concrete and immediate. 
And so, yet again, it is difficult to see in the result in Rasul II, Ali, 
or Gul any outright defiance of the Supreme Court.
215
  True, the D.C. 
Circuit in the damages cases again seemed unwilling to take seriously 
Boumediene’s effect on the proper analysis as to whether individual 
constitutional protections apply to non-citizens outside the territorial 
United States.  But it is hardly inconsistent with Boumediene or other 
Supreme Court decisions to (1) conclude that the defendant officers 
are entitled to qualified immunity in an area where the law was not 
well-settled, or (2) decline to recognize a Bivens remedy in a context 
in which one has not previously been recognized.  And nothing in 
Boumediene says anything about a detainee’s right to obtain adjudica-
tion of his detention after he is released. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Most of the commentary regarding the D.C. Circuit-subverting-
Boumediene meme has focused on the transfer and release cases, and 
for good reason.  Digging down to the nuts and bolts of those cases 
that turn on the facts is a time-consuming—and, given the amount of 
classified information in some of the opinions, often futile—task.  
Nevertheless, if the above analysis suggests any one conclusion in par-
ticular, it is that, other than Omar, cases like Al-Bihani and Al-Adahi 
reflect a far greater degree of hostility to the Supreme Court’s juri-
sprudence in this field than cases like Kiyemba I, Kiyemba II, and Rasul.  
Reasonable minds will surely disagree about whether the court of ap-
peals is reaching the “right” results in the latter cases, but if there are 
flaws in the specific holdings, my own view is that comparable short-
comings can also be found in much of the non-Guantánamo, non-
D.C. Circuit case law as well.  In contrast, on the “merits” of the de-
tainee cases, the analysis and the holdings reflect a profound tension 
with both Boumediene and Hamdi, and a fundamental unwillingness by 
the D.C. Circuit—especially Judges Brown, Kavanaugh, Randolph, 
and Silberman—to take seriously the implications of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in either case.  Between them, Hamdi and Boumediene 
 
 214 Id. at *2–4. 
 215 To be sure, the court in Gul “assum[ed] without deciding” that the collateral 
consequences doctrine applies to the Guantánamo detainees.  See id. at *3.  A case can 
certainly be made that the collateral consequences doctrine is compelled by the Sus-
pension Clause itself (and not just the federal habeas statute), and, as such, that its 
application follows from Boumediene.  But refusing to expressly so hold can hardly be 
criticized as subverting Boumediene. 
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do not just require some judicial review of the government’s evidence; 
rather, they compel a “meaningful” opportunity on the detainee’s 
part to challenge the factual and legal basis for his detention.  If every 
inference is being drawn against the detainee, or if the use of the 
“mosaic” theory is having the effect of watering down the burden of 
proof, it is difficult to conclude how such review satisfies that com-
mand. 
More generally, though, perhaps the larger point to take away is 
how the more troubling analyses vis-à-vis Hamdi and Boumediene inva-
riably originate with some combination of the same four jurists.  
Sometimes, they have been joined by others; sometimes, they have 
concurred separately.  But the decisions that have raised the sharpest 
tensions with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence have tended to 
come in cases in which the panel included two members of this quar-
tet.  In marked contrast, the rest of the D.C. Circuit has tended to-
ward more moderate holdings, embracing the growing consensus in 
both the district court and the executive branch as to (1) the relev-
ance of the laws of war vis-à-vis the scope of detention authority; (2) 
the extent to which the AUMF should not be interpreted by reference 
to the MCA; (3) the appropriateness of preponderance as the rele-
vant burden of proof; and (4) the requirement that detainees who 
have been cleared for release be afforded at least some remedy, even if 
that remedy is suboptimal.  That is not to commend the work of the 
rest of the D.C. Circuit as such, but merely to suggest that, where 
those cases have reached what some see as incorrect outcomes, there 
is nowhere near the same degree of tension between the work of the 
court of appeals and the guidance provided by the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, even as the number of Guantánamo detention cases 
inexorably winds down, it is hardly obvious that the D.C. Circuit will 
be done with the Guantánamo detainees anytime soon.  After all, un-
der the 2006 MCA, as amended in 2009, the D.C. Circuit hears ap-
peals as of right from decisions by the intermediate Court of Military 
Commission Review,
216
 which has finally handed down its first deci-
sions on the merits in post-conviction appeals under the MCA.
217
  Giv-
en the Obama administration’s decision to proceed with military 
commission trials for the 9/11 defendants, it seems inevitable that 
comparable issues will return to the D.C. Circuit before long, whether 
or not additional post-Boumediene detention cases raise them.  In light 
 
 216 10 U.S.C. § 950g (2006 & Supp. III 2010).  
 217 See United States v. Al-Bahlul, No. 09-001 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Sept. 9, 2011); 
United States v. Hamdan, No. 09-002 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. June 24, 2011).  
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of the cases surveyed above, it is entirely reasonable to suspect that 
Judges Brown, Kavanaugh, Randolph, and Silberman will show com-
parable skepticism toward the claims advanced by the defendants in 
those cases, whether or not such skepticism is warranted.  The ques-
tion then will be whether, as was true in Al-Bihani, their colleagues 
will see the need to intervene. 
